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NATIONAL SECURITY LAWYERING AND THE
PERSISTENT NEGLECT OF INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE
Peter Marguliest
National security legal advice often ignores institutional
culture. As both the Bush administration and its critics have
discovered, institutional culture in courts or agencies can
undermine the careful verbal formulations that lawyers fashion in
memos or briefs. Moreover, the interaction of legal language and
institutional culture engenders predictably adverse effects.
Ignorance of those effects-which can be inadvertent or strategic-
creates both ethical and policy perils. To address these dangers,
national security advice and advocacy should expressly consider
institutional culture's impact.
Government lawyers discounted institutional culture in one of
the worst injustices in American history: the Japanese-American
internment during World War II. In preparing the Government's
brief defending the forced evacuation of Japanese-Americans in
Korematsu v. United States, elite Justice Department lawyers faced a
dilemma. A War Department report had falsely claimed that
Japanese-Americans had sent radio transmissions to the forces of
the Japanese Empire. The report also made other claims based on
stereotypes and discredited sources, documented by Peter Irons in
his superb study, Justice at War. Assistant Attorney General Herbert
Wechsler, who as a professor at Columbia, drafted the Model Penal
Code, co-wrote a pioneering casebook on federal courts, and
authored a profoundly influential article on "neutral principles" in
constitutional law, recognized that he could not cite the War
Department report on the question of radio transmissions.
However, Wechsler and senior War Department officials were also
unwilling to straightforwardly repudiate the report. As a
compromise, Wechsler drafted the following footnote for the
Government's brief: "We have specifically recited in this brief facts
relating to the justification for the [forced evacuation] of which we
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ask the Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon the...
Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts."
The interaction of Wechsler's opaque footnote and the
Supreme Court's institutional culture created a troubling tension
with Wechsler's ethical obligations.
Lawyers must be candid with the tribunal, and refrain from
submitting false evidence. Had the Court known that the most
explosive charge in the War Department report was false, it might
have taken a different view of the entire dispute. However, the
Court was unlikely to do so without a clear statement by the
Government, since the Court had earlier relied on material from
the report in deciding Hirabayashi v. United States. Wechsler
discounted the Court's investment in the report, and convinced
himself that the cryptic language of the footnote would put the
Court on notice of the report's problems. Predictably, the Court in
Korematsu relied on the report in upholding the forced evacuation
ofJapanese-Americans.
The Bush administration's lawyers revealed a comparable
ignorance of institutional culture in government agencies dealing
with national security interrogations. Lawyers like William 'Jim"
Haynes, Pentagon General Counsel under Donald Rumsfeld, often
resorted to elaborate distinctions in their construction of legal
rules. Take the matter of "enhanced interrogation techniques."
One technique recommended by Haynes and authorized by
Rumsfeld regarding Mohammed al-Qahtani (the alleged twentieth
hijacker held at Guantanamo) was "removal of clothing." Al-
Qahtani's interrogators, and government personnel elsewhere,
interpreted this technique to mean forced nudity for detainees,
who were sometimes simultaneously exposed to angry dogs.
However, in testimony before Congress, Haynes insisted that
interrogators had failed to follow his instructions. Douglas Feith,
Undersecretary of Defense, put it best: "removal of clothing," he
insisted, "is different than naked." "Really?" a skeptical
Congressman Jerrold Nadler responded.
Institutional culture plays a role in this fine distinction. Of
course, on a literal level, Haynes and Feith were correct. An
interrogator could merely take off a subject's jacket or cuff-links.
As a matter of institutional culture, however, the great soul-jazz
singer Chaka Khan surely had it right: "Once you get started, it's
hard to stop." Interrogators will seek to push the envelope.
Settling for a jacket or cuff-links will seem half-baked, particularly
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when the interrogation occurs against a backdrop of concern about
a fresh attack.
This indifference to institutional culture is either genuine or
strategic. A lawyer like Haynes could well be sincere in assuming
that interrogators, who like others in the military are accustomed to
obeying orders, would not go beyond the conduct expressly
authorized. However, a lawyer could also be strategic, using a
particular verbal formulation to signal that interrogators could let
institutional culture run wild, while preserving deniability if
interrogation practices eventually triggered outside scrutiny.
Plausible deniability, as F.A.O. Schwarz and Aziz Huq said in their
important study of the Bush administration, Unchecked and
Unbalanced, is a kind of insurance policy for willfully errant decision
makers, allowing them to engage with impunity in acts that cross a
legal threshold.
The same failure to engage with institutional culture and other
facts on the ground also mars the work of John Yoo, author of the
infamous legal opinions from the elite Justice Department Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) now universally known as the "torture
memos." Yoo's opinions brand him as a less ambiguous figure than
Haynes; in his March 2003 memo, for example, Yoo gave
categorical advice that interrogators receiving an express order
from the President could use any technique, including methods
such as biting and maiming that the Government apparently never
employed. At first blush, this categorical approach might make
institutional culture irrelevant: since Yoo was willing to authorize
any method anyway, the exacerbating influence of institutional
culture seems beside the point. However, Yoo did in fact make
assumptions much like Haynes.
Yoo assumed, for example, that absent an express presidential
order, interrogators would not resort to extreme methods. While
this assumption appears to be correct for waterboarding-a
technique used on three detainees with specific presidential
approval-it may not hold true for other methods, such as forced
nudity. Signaling from higher-ups, conveyed with statements that
detainees are not protected persons under the Geneva Convention,
can interact with institutional culture to prompt the use of
techniques without presidential approval. However, Yoo and other
administration lawyers, such as White House Counsel and later
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, naively assumed that the
President could maintain discipline among interrogators in the
51892009]
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face of this signaling.
Yoo was more scrupulous in flagging the adverse consequences
that can emerge from a clash of institutional cultures between
government interrogators and the justice system. While Yoo
advised that interrogators who lacked the specific intent to cause
severe pain to their subjects would not be culpable, he invoked the
institutional culture of the American justice system in warning
officials about the limits of this advice. According to Yoo, "as a
matter of practice" ajury would likely vote to convict if a reasonable
person would have believed that a subject was suffering severe pain.
In this passage, Yoo came close to appreciating the legal risks that
an enhanced interrogation regime might engender when it
encountered an institutional culture shaped by the rule of law. Yoo
could profitably have extended this advice to the realms of global
public opinion and international relations, where America's use of
coercive interrogation has caused grave damage. Sadly, neither
Yoo nor the senior officials he advised took this hint.
Jack Goldsmith, who as Assistant Attorney General heading
OLC courageously withdrew several of Yoo's opinions, also failed to
take institutional culture into account when he authorized
temporarily removing undocumented aliens from Iraq for
interrogation. While Goldsmith's draft opinion reflected a
plausible view of international law and discussed opposing
arguments, his advice failed to adequately consider that even
temporary removal would allow the Government to conceal
detainees from monitoring authorities like the International
Committee of the Red Cross, thus augmenting the interrogation
archipelago that the Bush administration created. To his credit,
Goldsmith later worried publicly in his book The Terror Presidency
that his advice, in combination with the aggressive institutional
culture of the Bush administration, may have had this untoward
effect.
Administration critics have also sometimes failed to take
institutional culture into account. Consider, for example, criticism
directed at Daniel Levin, who took over from Goldsmith at OLC
and wrote a December 2004 memo stating that "torture is
abhorrent." Levin's memo contained a problematic footnote that
appeared to immunize prior administration decisions, asserting
that conclusions reached in Yoo's opinions would remain
unchanged under Levin's analysis. Administration critics like
David Luban, in his fine study, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, have
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focused on the "get out of jail free card" provided by Levin's
footnote. Levin did not help his cause with an arch explanation to
a congressional committee last year, in which he claimed that he
was merely offering a prediction based on Yoo's intellectual bent-
i.e., that Yoo, with his boundless deference to presidential power,
would have found some way to authorize enhanced techniques
regardless of the analysis employed. However, focusing on Levin's
footnote ignores a fact about the institutional culture of the Bush
administration revealed in Jane Mayer's The Dark Side, which
reports on interrogation policy after September 11.
According to Mayer, Levin's footnote was the price he paid to
persuade senior officials like Alberto Gonzales to permit issuance
of his anti-torture memo. Levin's strong denunciation of torture
may well have countered the administration's signaling: confirmed
reports of coercive interrogations at Guantanamo declined
precipitously after 2004. Levin's opinion may have had a causal,
correlational, or coincidental relationship with this decline.
However, Levin's critics have failed to acknowledge that his
footnote gave him traction with officials like Gonzales and David
Addington, Vice President Cheney's legal counsel. They have also
failed to weigh whether in a world of compromises it was
worthwhile to include the footnote in exchange for issuance of an
opinion that clearly condemned torture. While Levin also backslid
on another important point, by announcing a durational test for
torture that may have exempted the brief but extreme technique of
waterboarding, critics concede that the Government did not resort
to waterboarding after issuance of Levin's memo. In failing to
temper criticism of Levin with acknowledgment of his memo's
positive impact, critics failed to heed Voltaire's observation that
"the perfect is the enemy of the good."
Based on this track record, government lawyers giving national
security advice should be required to consider the institutional
culture that their advice would affect. Kathleen Clark, in her
pioneering article, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture
Memorandum, in the Journal of National Security Law and Policy, notes
the significance of Rule 2.1 of the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 2.1 suggests that the
lawyer may give advice about "moral, economic, social and political
factors, that may be relevant." In the government lawyer context,
the interaction of a legal opinion with institutional culture may
determine if the lawyer is reasonable in assuming that the limits of
2009] 5191
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the opinion will be observed, or whether the force of ingrained
culture will overwhelm those limits. If the limits are vulnerable, the
lawyer should reconsider the advice and either require more limits
on the conduct authorized or forego authorization entirely.
Failure to pursue this deliberation could result in adverse
consequences of the kind that were endemic to the Bush
administration: damage to the reputation and global standing of
the United States.
Considering institutional culture helps an entity's lawyer avoid
agency costs that arise because officials are short-term oriented
while the Nation has abiding interests. Careful deliberation forces
the lawyer to account for the long term, and flags instances where
agency costs may proliferate. This long-term orientation also serves
the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. Unduly
precipitous action by the executive, implemented in ignorance or
defiance of institutional culture, can create a backlash among the
other branches that ultimately weakens the executive branch. This
happened during the Bush administration, as the courts weighed in
heavily against administration policies on detention and trial of
suspected terrorists after unilateral executive action. Goldsmith
recognized in The Terror Presidency that forging a partnership with
Congress may have mitigated this backlash, and provided for more
steady executive power and prestige in the long term.
However, considering institutional culture will not always
result in telling the Government what not to do. Such a course
would institutionalize risk aversion to the detriment of national
security. Sometimes, in matters such as striking quickly across
borders to kill or capture terrorists, risk-preference will be the
appropriate course. Time may be fleeting, and risk-aversion may
result in a missed opportunity. Similarly, policies implemented in
the 1990s such as the "wall" between law enforcement and national
security that insulated prosecutions from tainted evidence may
have been inadvisable, not so much because by their terms they
prevented the free flow of information, but because they interacted
with the turf warfare that dominated the institutional culture
between law enforcement and national security agencies. In this
highly territorial environment, legal advice to create a "wall"
compounded, although it did not create, problems with
information sharing.
One also hopes that Bush administration critics will consider
institutional culture as they shape their stance on the policies of the
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Obama administration. While the Obama administration is still
young, it has already displayed signs of an eagerness for dialog and
transparency that contrast sharply with the predispositions of its
predecessor. Some of the outcomes reached by the new
administration will not be radically different from the results
insisted upon by Bush officials. For example, the Obama
administration will clearly seek a way to confine some of the
detainees now at Guantanamo. To achieve this goal, the new
administration may explore measures beyond trials in the civilian
justice system. However, the temperament and institutional culture
of the administration should make a difference in the reception
such measures receive. The new administration has clearly
signaled that it will adopt such measures, if at all, only after
extensive consultation with stakeholders. A predisposition toward
dialog should enhance the legitimacy of the administration's
proposals, even when those proposals yield results that may overlap
with outcomes that the former administration would have reached.
Bush critics should recognize that in the long term, an institutional
culture favoring dialog and transparency is more important than
outcomes in particular cases.
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